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INTRODUCTION 
The world is full of reminders that we are surrounded by inventions.  
When we see a light bulb, we remember Thomas Edison.1  When we hear a 
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our beautiful baby girl, Ayelet. 
1  See U.S. Patent No. 223,898 (filed Nov. 4, 1879) (specifying an “Improvement in Electric 
Lamps”). 
2  See U.S. Patent No. 174,465 (filed Feb. 14, 1876) (specifying an “Improvement in Telegraphy”). 
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with a Texas Instruments (TI) graphing calculator, do we think of Ann 
Phipps?  After all, like so many other products, the back of the TI-83 Plus is 
clearly marked with a list of patent numbers,3 including two naming Phipps 
as an inventor.4 
In all probability, few of us know that Phipps was not only a product 
manager in TI’s Consumer Products Division5 but that she was also one of 
the inventors of a “Calculator with Table Generation Capability.”6  By 
marking the back of the calculator with the number of this patent, TI as-
serted that the TI-83 Plus embodied this invention.  Yet, of all of the poten-
tially relevant patents assigned to TI, Phipps’s patents were two of only 
three listed on the back of this calculator.7  Surely, TI’s primary intention 
was not to help make Phipps famous.  More likely, TI marked patents on its 
product for legal effect. 
Patent marking is defined by the United States Patent Act as the act of 
physically labeling a product or its packaging with the identification num-
bers of patents that ostensibly protect the inventive ideas embodied in the 
product.8  The purpose of patent marking is to help prevent innocent in-
fringement.9  Marking provides constructive notice that a product is pro-
tected by the listed patent(s).10  Notably, there are also penalties for abuses 
of the patent marking system, known as “false marking.”11 
This Comment argues in favor of permitting “virtual marking,” where-




3  Next to other manufacturing and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) disclosures, the 
back of the TI-83 Plus reads “U.S.A. PATENTS / BREVETS / PATENTES 4823311 5377130 
5532946.”  Photograph of Back of TI-83 Plus (on file with author). 
4  See U.S. Patent No. 5,532,946 (filed Sept. 11, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 5,377,130 (filed Jan. 26, 
1993). 
5  See Press Release, Texas Instruments, Texas Instruments TI-82 Graphics Calculator Gives Sec-
ondary Students New Tools for Understanding Functions (Mar. 30, 1993), http://education.ti.com/ 
educationportal/sites/US/nonProductSingle/about_press_release_cg-388.html. 
6  See ’946 Patent. 
7  See supra note 4. 
8  See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006). 
9  DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., 537 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The purpose of the no-
tice requirement is to provide ‘protection against deception by unmarked patented articles.’  The idea is 
to prevent innocent infringement.” (citation omitted) (quoting Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. 
Equip., 297 U.S. 387, 398 (1936))).  “Innocent” infringement is infringement without intent or know-
ledge, as patent infringement is a strict liability offense.  See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON 
PATENTS § 16.02[2] (2005).  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction 
over appeals arising from issues in patent law.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a), 1338 (2006). 
10  35 U.S.C. § 287(a).  “Constructive notice” of a patent creates the presumption that the alleged in-
fringer has knowledge of the patent.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1164 (9th ed. 2009) (defining con-
structive notice). 
11  35 U.S.C. § 292(a).  Briefly, “false marking” arises when a manufacturer labels a product with 
incorrect or misleading patent numbers.  See infra Part II.B.  
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site that provides information about the product’s patent protection.12  For 
example, imagine that instead of marking the back of a calculator with “Pat. 
5532946,” TI marked it with “Patents: http://ti.com/patents/calculators,” 
and that website displayed nothing but “Pat. 5532946.”13  At first glance, 
the distinction might seem trivial, but even this simple example of virtual 
marking has far-reaching implications for patent marking law. 
The major advantage of virtual marking is that it untangles marking 
from the manufacturing process.  Physical marking is expensive, inflexible, 
and increasingly inapplicable (e.g., for services and Internet products, 
which have no physical embodiment).  For example, patentees must change 
their marks when their patents expire or become invalid in the course of lit-
igation.  But high manufacturing costs prevent patentees from changing 
their marks cheaply and efficiently.14  Virtual marking would enable paten-
tees to change their marks as quickly and easily as posting to a blog or 
sending an e-mail message. 
Patent marking has become a hot-button issue recently.  In the wake of 
a recent opinion from the Federal Circuit, which noted that enforcing the 
prohibition against false marking is an “important public policy,”15 the 
number of lawsuits alleging false marking skyrocketed last year.16  In Feb-
ruary 2010, a single individual filed twenty-eight lawsuits in the Northern 
District of Illinois alone,17 and he continued to file more throughout the 




12  The author uses the terms “manufacturer” and “patentee” loosely to connote the class of entities 
upon which the Patent Act imposes a duty to mark.  See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (referring to “[p]atentees, 
and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United States any patented article for or un-
der them, or importing any patented article into the United States”).  The parties involved are typically 
business entities, though individuals can also be liable for false marking or patent infringement. 
13  The simplicity of this example is not merely academic.  BlackBerry manufacturer Research in 
Motion had a similarly simplistic site.  See infra text accompanying note 93. 
14  See, e.g., Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co. (Pequignot I), 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 793 (E.D. Va. 2009) 
(“Solo estimates that it would have cost over $500,000 to replace all of the inner rings—the parts con-
taining the patent engravings—and $1.5 million to replace the cavities in their entirety.”), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
15  Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co. (Forest Group III), 590 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
16  To track over 700 false marking lawsuits that have been filed since January 1, 2010, see Justin E. 
Gray, False Marking Case Information, GRAY ON CLAIMS, http://www.grayonclaims.com/false-
marking-case-information (last updated Mar. 16, 2011); see also McDonnell Boehnen Hulbert & Berg-
hoff LLP, False Patent Marking, http://www.falsemarking.net (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (asserting that 
hundreds of false marking suits have been filed since January 1, 2010). 
17  Ameet Sachdev, Manufacturers Face Patent-Suit Headaches, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 2, 2010, § 6, at 
17, available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-0302-chicago-law-patents--
20100301,0,233340.story. 
18  See Gray, supra note 16 (listing false marking suits by litigant Thomas Simonian); Justin E. Gray, 
Filing of New False Patent Marking Cases Again Picking up Steam, GRAY ON CLAIMS, 
http://www.grayonclaims.com/home/2010/7/23/filing-of-new-false-patent-marking-cases-again-picking-
up-st.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (indicating that Simonian had filed forty false marking lawsuits 
by August 25, 2010). 
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more easily and cheaply, thereby improving their ability to avoid potential 
false marking liability. 
Several companies, including Research in Motion (RIM) and Callaway 
Golf, have already tried using some form of virtual marking.19  Today, vir-
tual marking does not comply with current patent marking law, but in 
March 2011 the Senate passed a bill that explicitly amends current law to 
authorize virtual marking, and the House is considering a bill that would do 
the same.20  Unfortunately, the amendment leaves much to be desired, and 
Congress should take several steps to ensure that virtual marking law im-
proves upon existing marking law. 
Accordingly, this Comment makes two arguments.  First, the virtual 
marking amendment should provide clearer guidelines to courts, which will 
ultimately be responsible for determining whether a particular virtual mark-
ing website complies with the statute.  For example, the amendment should 
protect the privacy of members of the general public by prohibiting virtual 
marking websites from tracking visitors.  Second, the government should 
either provide a public product registry or provide stringent guidelines for 
patentee or third-party marking websites.21 
Part I introduces current patent marking and notice law.  Part II pro-
vides a short history of patent marking law and an overview of the latest pa-
tent reform efforts in Congress, including a discussion of the proposed 
virtual marking amendment included in both the Patent Reform Act of 2009 
and the America Invents Act of 2011.  Part III presents two case studies of 
companies that recently used virtual marking, which highlight the inade-
quacy of the proposed virtual marking amendment.  Part IV analyzes the 
likely impact of virtual marking and proposes several modifications to ad-




19  See Callaway Golf Patents, CALLAWAYGOLF.COM, http://www.callawaygolf.com/Global/en-
US/Legal/CallawayGolfPatents.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2010) (image of former website on file with 
author); Patent Information, RESEARCH IN MOTION, http://www.rim.com/patents (last visited Nov. 9, 
2009) (image of former website on file with author).  Both of these websites have been taken down, but 
some of RIM’s pages have been archived.  See Archive of RIM’s Patents Website, WEBARCHIVE.ORG, 
http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://rim.net/patents (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
20  See America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 15(a)(1) (as reported by H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Apr. 14, 2011); America Invents Act, S. 23, 112th Cong. § 4(b) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8, 
2011).  Section 4(b) of the 2011 bill is identical to section 4(e) of the 2009 bill, which expired when the 
111th Congress adjourned.  See S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(e) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Apr. 2, 2009). 
21  Chicago-based intellectual property asset management company Ocean Tomo launched a product 
registry service on February 8, 2010.  Press Release, Ocean Tomo, Ocean Tomo First to Directly Match 
Patents to Products (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.patentmarking.com/patentmarking/newsFiles/ 
Patent%20Marking%20Release%202--8-10.pdf; see also infra text accompanying notes 178–79 (dis-
cussing the benefits of authorizing privately run registries). 
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I. PATENT MARKING 
A. Marking and Notice 
In general, an unlicensed manufacturer that duplicates a patented in-
vention may be liable to a patentee for infringement in a civil action.22  The 
law permits patentees to recover damages23 or seek an injunctive remedy.24  
Infringement need not be willful; even an innocent manufacturer that inde-
pendently invents a previously patented idea can be strictly liable for in-
fringement.25  However, if the infringement is willful, the infringer can be 
liable for treble damages.26 
To mitigate some of the risk to an innocent infringer, § 287 of the Pa-
tent Act limits the potential damages that a patentee could otherwise recov-
er.27  In particular, under § 287(a) the infringer is only liable if it had notice 
that the article was patented.28  Marking enables the patent holder to provide 
constructive notice by labeling its product with the identification numbers 




22  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“[W]hoever without authority makes . . . any patented invention . . . 
infringes the patent.”); id. § 281 (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his 
patent.”). 
23  Id. § 283. 
24  Id. § 284.  
25  See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“Because patent 
infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the offense is only relevant in determining whether 
enhanced damages are warranted.”). 
26  See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (permitting enhanced damages at the discretion of the court); Beatrice Foods 
Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that an 
award of enhanced damages requires a showing of willful infringement).  
27  See 35 U.S.C. § 287. 
28  Id. § 287(a) (“[N]o damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, 
except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereaf-
ter . . . .”); see also DSW, Inc. v. Shoe Pavilion, Inc., 537 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The pur-
pose of the notice requirement . . . is to prevent innocent infringement.” (citation omitted)). 
29  35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (“Patentees . . . may give notice to the public that [any patented article] is pa-
tented, either by fixing thereon the word ‘patent’ or the abbreviation ‘pat.’, together with the number of 
the patent . . . .”).  Marking intellectual property to give notice to the public is not unique to patent law.  
For example, with respect to federal trademark law, marketing material often includes the ® symbol 
next to registered trade names, brand names, logos, and slogans to give notice that they are registered 
marks.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006).   
In copyright law, there is no duty to mark a copy of a copyrighted work, but an alleged infringer 
cannot claim the defense of innocent infringement if the alleged infringer had access to a marked copy.  
See 17 U.S.C. § 401(d) (2006) (concerning visually perceptible copies marked with the © symbol); id. 
§ 402(d) (concerning phonorecords of sound recordings marked with the ℗ symbol).  Thus, innocent 
infringement might involve, for example, making a copy of an unmarked book that the infringer reason-
ably believed was in the public domain.   
Finally, the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act imposes a duty to mark vessel hull and deck designs.  
Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 502, 112 Stat. 2860, 2905–07 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1332 
(2006)).  Otherwise, if the design infringer did not have actual written notice before undertaking infring-
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suit—another way of providing notice30—is that compensable infringement 
occurs, and thus damages begin to accrue, at an earlier point in time. 
A common misconception about patent marking is that it offers paten-
tees a perquisite of “extra” damages.  In fact, the statute imposes a duty to 
mark.  The penalty for failure to mark is a limitation on damages for in-
fringement.31  That is, if the infringer did not have notice, the patentee can-
not recover damages that accrued before a lawsuit was filed. 
Not all patentees, however, have a duty to mark.  For example, in each 
of these three scenarios no such duty exists32: (1) a patentee owns the patent 
for a machine but does not manufacture it,33 (2) a patentee owns a process 
but does not manufacture anything that embodies the process,34 and (3) a 
patentee owns a process and manufactures an article that embodies the 
process.35  Because these patentees do not have a duty to mark, § 287 does 
                                                                                                                 
ing activities, the design owner must reimburse the infringer’s reasonable expenditures and contractual 
obligations before obtaining an injunction.  17 U.S.C. § 1307. 
30  35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (“Filing of an action for infringement shall constitute . . . notice.”). 
31  Id. (“In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any ac-
tion for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the infringement and continued 
to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring after 
such notice.  Filing of an action for infringement shall constitute such notice.” (emphasis added)).  
32  The scenarios refer to processes and machines.  “Process” (or “method”) and “machine” (or “ap-
paratus”) are terms of art in patent law.  For example, a business method may be patentable as a process 
even if it is not tied to a particular machine.  See id. § 101 (establishing that new and useful processes 
and machines are patentable); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (rejecting the 
Federal Circuit’s test that a claimed process is only patentable under § 101 if it is tied to a machine or 
apparatus or it “transforms a particular article into a different state or thing” (quoting In re Bilski, 
545 F.3d 943, 944 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).  
33  Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 397 (1936) (holding that the 
marking statute did not “impose a new and different burden upon non-producing patentees” thereby de-
priving them of the right “to claim damages from an infringer unless and until he could be run down and 
served with actual notice”).  Although the Supreme Court decided Wine Railway under older patent 
laws, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly applied its holdings under the current Patent Act.  See, e.g., Tex. 
Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Although Wine Railway in-
terpreted a predecessor to the current patent marking statute, we have applied Wine Railway to the mod-
ern statutory counterpart . . . .”). 
34  Wine Ry., 297 U.S. at 395 (finding that Congress did not intend to permit “process patents and 
patents under which nothing has been manufactured” to be “secretly infringed with impunity”); Bandag, 
Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that “the notice requirement 
of this statute does not apply where the patent is directed to a process or method” because there is no 
“patented article” to mark). 
35  This scenario is more complicated because, unlike the first two scenarios in which the patentee 
does not manufacture anything, it arguably involves a manufactured article available to mark.  It is fur-
ther complicated by the fact that a single patent can contain both process and apparatus claims and that 
the patentee chooses which claims within a patent to assert in an infringement action.  In this third sce-
nario, if the patentee asserts only process claims, then the patentee still has no duty to mark the manufac-
tured article to give notice of a patent that contains both process and apparatus claims.  See Crown 
Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 559 F.3d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Because 
Rexam asserted only the method claims of the ’839 patent, the marking requirement of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 287(a) does not apply.”).  However, if the patentee in this third scenario asserts both process and appa-
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not bar them from seeking damages that may have accrued before the in-
fringer had notice of the infringed patent.36  The Supreme Court’s rationale 
for exempting the nonmanufacturing patentees from the marking require-
ment is that “[p]enalty for failure implies opportunity to perform.”37  These 
nonmanufacturing patentees have no opportunity to physically mark their 
products, so they are exempt from the penalty. 
Being exempt from the duty to mark, however, is a double-edged 
sword for nonmanufacturing patentees.38  Although nonmanufacturing pa-
tentees need not mark anything to seek damages for infringement occurring 
before the infringer had notice of the patent, those damages are limited to a 
“reasonable royalty”—what the infringer would have reasonably paid to li-
cense the patent during the time period preceding the lawsuit filing date.39  
On the other hand, manufacturing patentees who satisfy their duty to mark 
may seek greater damages in the form of lost profits for the additional time 
period that marking protects, from the initiation of infringement of the 
marked article to the filing of the lawsuit.40 
To recover under the marking statute, patentees must satisfy the re-
quirement that marking be “consistent and continuous.”41  Courts have de-
                                                                                                                 
ratus claims from the patent, and the article was not marked, then the plaintiff is barred from seeking 
pre-lawsuit damages for both the process and apparatus claims.  See Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng’g 
Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[B]oth apparatus and method claims of the ’765 patent were 
asserted . . . .  Therefore, we conclude that AMS was required to mark its product pursuant to sec-
tion 287(a) in order to recover damages under its method claims . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
36  E.g., Tex. Digital Sys., 308 F.3d at 1220 (“The recovery of damages is not limited where there is 
no failure to mark, i.e., where the proper patent notice appears on products or where there are no prod-
ucts to mark.”); see also supra notes 32–35 (describing three scenarios in which there is no duty to 
mark). 
37  Wine Ry., 297 U.S. at 395. 
38  A nonmanufacturing patentee is often referred to as a “non-practicing entity” (NPE) or, pejora-
tively, a “patent troll.”  See Has the Enemy of Patent Trolls Become One?, CIOINSIGHT (Dec. 5, 2005), 
http://www.cioinsight.com/c/a/Trends/Has-the-Enemy-of-Patent-Trolls-Become-One (“In 2001, when 
he was assistant general counsel at Intel Corp., Peter Detkin famously coined the term ‘patent troll’ to 
describe firms that acquire patents only to extract settlements from companies on dubious infringement 
claims.”). 
39  See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Dam-
ages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585, 1595 n.43 (1998) (defining 
reasonable royalty as “the royalty that willing parties would have agreed to had they negotiated a license 
under the patent” (citing 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03 (1997))). 
40  Blair & Cotter, supra note 39, at 1595 n.43 (“Lost profits, in [the] form of sales diversion, price 
erosion, or increased expense, are an appropriate basis for recovery when the patent owner (or an exclu-
sive licensee) exploits the lawful exclusive rights of the patent directly by manufacture, use or sale.” 
(citing CHISUM, supra note 39, § 20.03)).  Some indirect damages may be recoverable as well.  See Rite-
Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546–47 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that damages could include 
recovery for lost sales for a device not covered by the patent in suit). 
41  See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“In order to 
satisfy the constructive notice provision of the marking statute, Nike must have shown that substantially 
all of the Air Mada Mid shoes being distributed were marked, and that once marking was begun, the 
marking was substantially consistent and continuous.”). 
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veloped this standard because § 287 does not expressly define what is re-
quired to comply with the marking statute.42  In general, a patentee fails to 
meet this standard if it neglects to mark some of the manufactured articles 
or stops marking the articles altogether for some period of time.43  Com-
pliance under this standard is a question of fact, and the patentee has the 
burden of proving compliance.44 
If Congress amends § 287 to permit virtual marking, courts will have 
the challenge of determining what form of virtual marking complies with 
the consistent-and-continuous standard under the statute.45  For example, if 
a company’s virtual marking website experiences server downtime, a court 
will have to decide whether that constitutes a violation of the continuous 
prong of the consistent-and-continuous standard. 
B. False Marking 
Patentees who mark their products with incorrect patent numbers risk 
exposure to charges of false marking.  To shield against the power accorded 
to patentees by § 287, § 292 prohibits false marking to deter patentees from 
deceitful abuse of the system.46  Proscription against false marking has ex-
isted since the inception of marking law and remains largely unchanged 
from its historical origins.47  Currently, a patentee can be fined up to $500 
for each offense.48  False marking claims are relatively easy to file. 
Even though § 292 is a criminal statute,49 it provides a qui tam action, 




42  See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (explaining only that marking is achieved “by fixing thereon the word 
‘patent’ or the abbreviation ‘pat.’, together with the number of the patent, or when . . . this can not be 
done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more of them is contained, a label containing a 
like notice”). 
43  See, e.g., Nike, 138 F.3d at 1447 (remanding because Nike could not meet its burden where Wal-
Mart alleged that some of Nike’s shoes were sold unmarked). 
44  Id. (“[C]ompliance with the marking statute is a question of fact, and the burden of proving com-
pliance with the marking statute is upon the patentee.” (citing Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 
1111 (Fed. Cir. 1996))). 
45  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
46  See 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (imposing a fine for deceiving the public with a false mark). 
47  For a discussion of the history of false marking law, see infra Part II.A. 
48  35 U.S.C. § 292(a).  In the most straightforward case, a manufacturer may be fined up to $500 for 
each instance in which it marks a product with a fake patent number with the intent to deceive the pub-
lic.  Id.  A nefarious manufacturer might choose to mark fraudulently for several reasons.  First, a manu-
facturer may do so for the purpose of counterfeiting or to make customers think the product is more 
valuable or useful because it involves an invention.  Second, false marking might deter potential com-
petitors from duplicating the functionality of the product by causing them to assume, upon seeing the 
mark, that their potential similar venture will be a futile and expensive act of infringement.  This reason 
is not as far-fetched as it sounds, particularly when the manufacturer uses virtual marking.  A virtual 
marking website listing thousands of patent numbers, where some apply but others do not, creates an 
enormous amount of due diligence work for a potential competitor, which must sift through the list.  See 
infra Part IV.B.1. 
49  S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 9 (1952). 
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States and keep part of the penalty as a bounty.50  The ease with which any 
individual can file a false marking claim has drawn the attention of Con-
gress.  The House’s and Senate’s 2011 patent reform bills include an 
amendment to § 292, which would eliminate the qui tam action and limit 
private lawsuits to plaintiffs who have “suffered a competitive injury” due 
to false marking violations.51 
In the meantime, however, patentees must be careful about the accura-
cy of patent numbers marked on their products.  Even patentees who use 
virtual marking might be liable for false marking if their virtual marking 
websites list inaccurate patent numbers.  False marking cases have pro-
duced occasionally bizarre but highly influential results, which are dis-
cussed fully below.52 
C. Virtual Marking 
The rationale for virtual marking is that patenting an invention and 
manufacturing a product are distinct processes.  Patents are dynamic: new 
patents are granted, existing patents expire, and a patent’s scope may 
change during its lifetime.  Manufacturing, on the other hand, is typically 
static: manufacturing equipment is expensive to change, and individual 
products are not modified after production.  Traditional patent marking en-
tangles these different processes by requiring patent numbers to be labeled 
on physical products.  Section 287 describes precisely how manufactured 




50  35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (“Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event one-half shall go to the 
person suing and the other to the use of the United States.”).  Although a payday of up to $250 for a sin-
gle offense might be insufficient motivation to sue, the penalty could escalate quickly if a manufacturing 
process had generated multiple offenses.   
Like marking and notice, false marking of intellectual property is not unique to patent law.  Under 
federal trademark law, there is neither a qui tam action nor a fixed penalty for false marking, but false 
trademark marking is still an act of fraud.  See Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46, 60 Stat. 427, 444 (co-
dified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2006)); 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:146 (4th ed. 2009) (discussing false trademark marking as developed 
by case law in the absence of an explicit false marking statute in the Trademark Act).  There is no expli-
cit false marking statute in the Copyright Act for ordinary works.  However, there is a false marking sta-
tute in the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, which Congress closely modeled after § 292 of the Patent 
Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006) (providing a qui tam action for one-half of the penalty, a fine of not 
more than $500 for each offense of false design marking). 
51  H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 15(b) (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 14, 2011); S. 
23, 112th Cong. § 2(k) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8, 2011).  This amendment first appeared in 2010.  
See Kevin E. Noonan, Qui Tam Actions in Senate Sights: Manager’s Amendment of S. 515 Would Elim-
inate Most Suits, PATENT DOCS (Mar. 4, 2010, 5:28 PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/03/qui-tam-
actions-in-senate-sights.html; see also Stephen Albainy-Jenei, The Patent Reform Act of 2010: A Substi-
tute S. 515, PATENT BARISTAS (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.patentbaristas.com/archives/2010/03/05/the-
patent-reform-act-of-2010-a-substitute-s-515 (describing the amendment and providing a link to an un-
official version: http://www.patentbaristas.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/GRA10057.pdf). 
52  See infra Part IV.A.2–3. 
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[E]ither by fixing thereon the word “patent” or the abbreviation “pat.”, togeth-
er with the number of the patent, or when, from the character of the article, this 
can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein one or more of them 
is contained, a label containing a like notice.53 
With virtual marking, instead of marking a manufactured article with a 
patent number, the patentee marks it with a Uniform Resource Locator 
(URL), or web address, such as http://acme.com/patents/product.54  The 
URL points to a website that lists the patent numbers that would otherwise 
have been marked directly on the product.55 
At first glance, there is minimal difference between ordinary patent 
marking and virtual marking: the same result is achieved, except that virtual 
marking adds the extra step of typing the URL into a web browser to find 
the relevant patent numbers.  However, that extra step makes a profound 
difference for patentees’ ability to maintain compliance and for the general 
public’s ability to obtain complete and accurate information about what is 
patent-protected. 
II. VIRTUALLY THERE: PATENT REFORM 
In addition to the proposed amendment to the false marking statute, the 
Patent Reform Act of 2009 and the America Invents Act of 2011 both in-
clude a proposed amendment to § 287, which would permit virtual marking 
as an alternative method for complying with the duty to mark.56  This Part 
presents a brief history of patent marking law and provides an overview of 





53  35 U.S.C. § 287(a). 
54  In 1999, the Section for Intellectual Property of the American Bar Association proposed amend-
ments to § 287(a) resembling contemporary proposals for virtual marking.  The virtual marking pro-
posed would convey notice either by providing instructions for obtaining a list of patents pertaining to 
the product or by including a marking denoting that the patents are listed on a “National Patented Prod-
uct Register” maintained by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  See Proposed Resolutions 
108-8 & 108-9, 1999 A.B.A. SEC. FOR INTELL. PROP. 55 (Mark K. Dickson & David A. Rose eds., 
1999).   
55  No form of intellectual property in the United States permits virtual marking today.  Trademark 
law in particular would benefit from virtual marking to identify the registration number of the trademark 
and convey other related information.  The closest concept in trademark law to virtual marking is the 
practice of detailing trademark usage information on a registrant’s website.  See, e.g., Guidelines for 
Third Party Use of Google Brand Features, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/permissions/ 
guidelines.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (requesting that the public never use “Google” as a verb); 
General Microsoft Trademark Guidelines, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/about/legal/ 
trademarks/usage/general.mspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (requesting that the public never refer to 
multiple presentations as “PowerPoints”). 
56  See America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 15(a)(1) (as reported by H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, Apr. 14, 2011); America Invents Act, S. 23, 112th Cong. § 4(b) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8, 
2011); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(e) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, Apr. 2, 2009).  Although some companies such as RIM and Callaway engage in a form of virtual 
marking, their virtual marking practices do not comply with § 287 as it exists today.  See infra Part III. 
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A. History of Patent Marking Law 
The virtual marking amendment passed in the Senate in March 2011 
and currently pending in the House is the most recent step in the marking 
statute’s long development.  U.S. patent law arose directly from the Consti-
tution, which grants Congress the power to “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”57  
Congress first took up its charge by passing the Patent Act in April of 
1790,58 and President George Washington signed the first patent about three 
months later.59  Congress has replaced this original legislation several 
times—first in 179360 and most recently in 1952.61  The 1952 Act, which 
has been amended at various times, forms the basis of modern U.S. patent 
law. 
For decades, U.S. patent law did not contain any marking provisions, 
and patentees had no duty to mark products or give notice to potential in-
fringers.62  Not until 1842 did marking and false marking provisions first 
appear.63  At first, a failure to satisfy the affirmative duty to mark resulted in 
a fine of at least $100, the same penalty imposed at the time for false mark-
ing.64  However, in 1861, Congress changed the penalty for failing to mark 
to a limitation on damages, which endures in the modern marking statute.65  
Congress enacted the present-day form of both the marking and false 
marking statutes as part of the 1952 Act.66  Significantly, the maximum 




57  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  No debate over this Clause was recorded.  KENNETH W. DOBYNS, 
THE PATENT OFFICE PONY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY PATENT OFFICE 19 (1997). 
58  Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793).  The United States had its first patent sta-
tute before its thirteenth state.  DOBYNS, supra note 57, at 22 (noting that Rhode Island did not ratify the 
Constitution and join the Union until May 29, 1790). 
59  U.S. Patent No. X1 (issued July 31, 1790) (claiming an improvement “in the making of Pot ash 
and Pearl ash by a new Apparatus and Process”). 
60  Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 12, 1 Stat. 318, 323 (repealed 1836).  The 1793 Patent Act abolished 
the Patent Board and eliminated examination of patent applications, automatically registering patents 
and leaving them to the courts to sort out.  DOBYNS, supra note 57, at 35. 
61  Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. (2006)). 
62  CHISUM, supra note 39, § 20.03[7][c][i] (1997).  The Supreme Court had noted that “[p]atents are 
public records” and that “[a]ll persons are bound to take notice of their contents.”  Boyden v. Burke, 
55 U.S. (14 How.) 575, 582 (1852). 
63  See Patent Act of 1842, ch. 263, §§ 5–6, 5 Stat. 543, 544–45 (repealed 1861); CHISUM, supra 
note 39, § 20.03[7][c][i]. 
64  See Patent Act of 1842, §§ 5–6, 5 Stat. at 544–45. 
65  Patent Act of 1861, ch. 88, § 13, 12 Stat. 246, 249 (repealing Patent Act of 1842, § 6); cf. 
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) (providing that the penalty for breaching the affirmative duty to mark is a 
similar limitation on damages). 
66  Patent Act of 1952, §§ 287, 292.  For an overview of the current marking statutes, see supra 
Part I.A–C. 
67  Patent Act of 1952, § 292(a). 
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flation, the statutory fine would be capped at just over $4000 per offense 
today.68  Although false marking actions have become less lucrative in prin-
ciple due to inflation, they are becoming increasingly vogue in practice be-
cause the potential total fine grows quickly for mass-produced products 
such as plastic coffee lids.69 
B. The Patent Reform Act of 2009 and the America Invents Act of 2011 
U.S. patent law reform has been a recurring issue for at least the past 
four sessions of Congress.70  When Senator Patrick Leahy introduced his 
previous patent reform proposal on March 3, 2009, he implored Congress to 
amend the patent system to reflect the modern technological and commer-
cial environment.71  The 2009 Senate bill, which did not end up being put to 
a vote,72 differed from both the bill as Leahy introduced it and a subsequent 
House bill in that it included an amendment to § 287 to permit virtual mark-
ing.73  Despite the failure of the Patent Reform Act of 2009, Senator Leahy 
introduced similar legislation in 2011, which the Senate passed as the 
America Invents Act in March 2011.74  If any provision in both the 2009 
and 2011 bills exemplifies the technological advances of the Information 
Age, it is the virtual marking amendment.  If the House passes the 2011 bill, 
patentees will be able to utilize the Internet to mark their products and ful-
fill their statutory duty.  
Historically, patent reform has been hotly debated, and many parts of 




68  To calculate inflation of the marking fine, see CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (calculating 
that $500 in 1952 had the same buying power as $4175.64 in 2011).   
69  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
70  See, e.g., H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 14, 2011); 
S. 23, 112th Cong. (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8, 2011); S. 515, 111th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 2009); S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006).  The four 
Senate bills were all cosponsored by at least Senators Patrick Leahy and Orrin Hatch.  See S. 35, S. 515; 
S. 1145; S. 3818.  The Senate passed the most recent bill on March 8, 2011; on April 14, 2011, the 
House Committee on the Judiciary reported a version. 
71  See 155 CONG. REC. S2707 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (introducing 
S. 515). 
72  See S. 515: Patent Reform Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bill.xpd?bill=s111-515 (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (noting that the bill never became law, as all pro-
posed bills that have not been passed are cleared from the books at the end of each Congress). 
73  For the full details of the virtual marking amendment, see infra Part II.C. 
74  See H.R. 1249; S. 23. 
75  See, e.g., Grant Gross, Technology Issues on Back Burner in U.S. Congress, CIO.COM, Sept. 
15, 2009, http://www.cio.com/article/502199/Technology_Issues_on_Back_Burner_in_US_Congress 
(“[G]roups on both sides of the issue seem unwilling to compromise.  The debate has largely pitted large 
tech vendors against pharmaceutical companies, small inventors and some small tech vendors, who op-
pose the changes.”); Kevin E. Noonan, Reaction to Senate Patent Reform Act (S. 23), PATENT DOCS 
(Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.patentdocs.org/2011/02/reaction-to-senate-patent-reform-act-s23.html (sum-
marizing criticism of the 2011 bill from a variety of lobbying organizations). 
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ment, however, appears to be uncontroversial: the addition of the virtual 
marking amendment to Senator Leahy’s 2009 bill garnered not a single 
mention on the record.76  Following the official reporting of the bill, Leahy 
made an additional report on May 12, 2009, to accompany the bill.77  In it, 
Leahy suggested that the virtual marking amendment would “save costs for 
producers of products that include technology on which a patent issues after 
the product is on the market, and will facilitate effective marking on smaller 
products.”78  Leahy also clarified that the amendment would not shift away 
from the patentee the burden of proving that the marking was effective.79 
Aside from Senator Leahy’s report, the only other official comment on 
virtual marking came from a Department of Commerce letter to the Senate, 
which included a brief statement of the Obama Administration’s support for 
virtual marking.80  Although the virtual marking amendment from the 2009 
and 2011 bills represents a step in the right direction, the amendment does 
not go far enough to ensure that it would lead to useful and beneficial 
changes in manufacturing practices.81 
C. The Proposed Virtual Marking Amendment 
The marking statutes have gone through only minor revisions by 
amendment since they were first introduced in 1952.82  The virtual marking 
amendment that was first proposed in 2009 and reintroduced in 2011 would 
permit marking with a URL instead of patent numbers.83  The amendment 
as passed by the Senate in March 2011 and as currently pending in the 
House would insert the following provision into § 287(a): 
Patentees, and persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United 
States any patented article for or under them, or importing any patented article 
into the United States, may give notice to the public that the same is patented, 
either by fixing thereon the word “patent” or the abbreviation “pat.”, together 




76  See Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions: Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (providing no reference to virtual marking in the 
entire hearing on patent reform). 
77  See S. REP. NO. 111-18 (2009). 
78  Id. at 14. 
79  Id. 
80  Letter from Gary Locke, Sec’y of Commerce, Dep’t of Commerce, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chair-
man, and Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary 5 (Oct. 5, 2009), 
available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/letters/111/S515Oct0509.pdf (“The Administration 
supports . . . permitting virtual marking of patented articles on a USPTO-managed website to provide 
innovators a cost-saving alternative for marking products.”). 
81  See infra Part IV.B. 
82  The last time Congress made any changes to § 287 was in 1999.  See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2006) 
(providing amendment history in the notes following the text of the statute, under “Amendments”). 
83  H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 15(a)(1) (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 14, 2011); S. 
23, 112th Cong. § 4(b) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8, 2011); S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(e) (as reported by 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 2009). 
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abbreviation “pat.” together with an address of a posting on the Internet, ac-
cessible to the public without charge for accessing the address, that associates 
the patented article with the number of the patent, or when, from the character 
of the article, this can not be done, by fixing to it, or to the package wherein 
one or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.  In the event 
of failure so to mark, no damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any ac-
tion for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the in-
fringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may 
be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.  Filing of an 
action for infringement shall constitute such notice.84 
Throughout the remainder of this Comment, the term “virtual marking 
site” will be used to denote “a posting on the Internet, accessible to the pub-
lic without charge for accessing the address, that associates the patented ar-
ticle with the number of the patent” as conceived by the proposed 
amendment.85  The term “product page” will be used to denote a part of a 
virtual marking site that is specific to a single product.  Having explored the 
historical origins and possible future of patent marking law, this Comment 
will discuss the practical implications of virtual marking. 
III. VIRTUAL MARKING IMPLEMENTATIONS 
Despite the fact that the virtual marking amendment did not become 
law in 2009 and is still pending in the House in 2011, some companies have 
already tried using or promoting some form of virtual marking.  Although a 
court would not consider a virtual marking site compliant with the current 
form of § 287, these early examples of virtual marking provide a glimpse at 
what these companies thought ought to be considered compliant.  They also 
highlight problems with the virtual marking amendment, which as proposed 
lacks provisions that would ensure that the potential benefits of virtual 
marking materialize.86 
This Part presents recent implementations of virtual marking.  The first 
came from Research in Motion (RIM), which manufactures the BlackBerry 
line of mobile devices.  The second is from Callaway Golf. 
A. Research in Motion: An Attenuated Marking Site 
RIM formerly marked its devices, not with patent numbers, but with a 




84  The passage depicts § 287(a) with the language of the virtual marking proposal italicized.  
35 U.S.C. § 287(a); H.R. 1249 § 15(a)(1); S. 23 § 4(b). 
85  See H.R. 1249 § 15(a)(1); S. 23 § 4(b). 
86  See infra Part IV.B. 
87  For an image of a marked BlackBerry Curve 8300, see Kevin Michaluk, Smartphone Round Rob-
in: Back on the Crack and Loving It!, CRACKBERRY.COM (Dec. 8, 2007, 4:50 PM), 
http://crackberry.com/smartphone-round-robin-back-crack-and-loving-it (containing an image captioned 
“While I had the Battery Cover off, I figured a new 6GB MicroSDHC card would make a nice present to 
myself and my BlackBerry,” which displays RIM’s patent website’s URL labeled on the electronics). 
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a virtual marking site.  Technically, however, RIM’s marking approach did 
not comply with § 287(a), which explicitly requires marking the number of 
the patent on the product itself or, if necessary, on the packaging in which 
the product is contained.89  Because RIM used virtual marking but does not 
use traditional marking on the BlackBerry itself or the BlackBerry’s pack-
aging, RIM’s virtual marking did not satisfy the statute.90  RIM has since 
taken down its patent webpage. 
An interesting question is whether RIM’s site would have constituted 
legally sufficient marking under the virtual marking amendment that the 
Senate passed in March 2011 and the House is currently considering.91  By 
keeping the site updated and listing many patent numbers from around the 
world, RIM arguably provided more detailed and timely information than it 
could have if it had only labeled its BlackBerry devices with a handful of 
U.S. patent numbers.  However, recall that the proposed amendment would 
require “associat[ing] the patented article with the number of the patent.”92  
RIM’s site listed thousands of patent numbers worldwide from over fifty 
countries, including over four hundred from the United States alone.93  Yet, 
RIM’s site did not satisfy this provision because every BlackBerry refe-
renced the same website, and the site did not indicate which patent numbers 
were associated with particular models.94  Therefore, RIM’s site likely satis-
fied neither current marking law nor the proposed virtual marking amend-
ment. 
The site’s design also exposed RIM to potential liability for false mark-
ing under § 292.95  If a competitor saw a BlackBerry marked with the ad-
dress and visited RIM’s site, it may have been led to believe that all of the 
thousands of listed patents protected the device when, in reality, only a sub-
set of those patents actually cover it.  Although it would have been a Hercu-
lean task to look up and sift through every patent listed on RIM’s site, at 
least one of the patents that was listed on the site clearly does not cover all 
of RIM’s products: U.S. Design Patent No. D556,191 (the D’191 patent).  
This patent claims a design for a mobile keypad with four rows of five keys 
                                                                                                                 
88  See Patent Information, supra note 19. 
89  35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006). 
90  See id.  J. Matt Buchanan also raised the issue of whether RIM’s site constituted “legally suffi-
cient marking” although he did not resolve the question.  J. Matt Buchanan, Product Marking by Refer-
ence to Website, PROMOTE THE PROGRESS (Nov. 15, 2004, 7:55 AM), http://promotetheprogress.com/ 
product-marking-by-reference-to-website. 
91  Buchanan suggested that RIM’s site “would probably be insufficient under the amendment” be-
cause it did not differentiate between RIM’s products.  J. Matthew Buchanan, Posting, TWITTER (Apr. 2, 
2009), http://twitter.com/ptp/statuses/1438247638.  
92  H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 15(a)(1) (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 14, 2011); 
S. 23, 112th Cong. § 4(b) (as passed by Senate, Mar. 8, 2011). 
93  See Patent Information, supra note 19. 
94  See id. (providing a list of patents by country but not by product). 
95  See 35 U.S.C. § 292. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 382 
patterned after the traditional QWERTY layout,96 except that most keys 
have two letters (for example, the top-left key contains both “Q” and 
“W”).97  Not all of RIM’s models use this design, however.  For example, 
the BlackBerry Curve 8300 has a “full QWERTY keyboard that is opti-
mized for fast, accurate typing,”98 and the BlackBerry Storm2 9550 has a 
full-size touch screen but no physical keyboard at all.99  
According to § 292, anyone who marks an unpatented article with an 
indication that it is patented in order to deceive the public is liable for false 
marking.100  Although the Curve and Storm2 models are undoubtedly cov-
ered by many patents that were listed on RIM’s site, they are not covered by 
at least the D’191 patent.  Members of the public viewing the long list of 
patents on RIM’s website might have been deceived into thinking that over 
four hundred patents, including the D’191 patent, cover a particular Black-
Berry device when some do not.  Although the virtual marking amendment 
would not have changed the false marking statute, it is likely that a poorly 
designed or maintained virtual marking site might expose a patentee to false 
marking liability.  If RIM’s site had differentiated among its products by, 
for example, including the D’191 patent in a list of patents covering the 
Blackberry Pearl but not a list of patents for the Curve, then RIM would 
have been better positioned to comply with both § 287 and § 292.  
B. Callaway Golf: Driving Closer to the Green 
Until it was recently taken down as well, Callaway Golf’s (Callaway’s) 
patent website101 asserted that “[i]n accordance with Section 287(a) of Title 
35 of the United States Code, the reader is hereby placed on notice of Cal-
laway Golf Company’s rights in the United States Patents listed on this 
site.”102  Like RIM’s patent website, though, Callaway’s site likely did not 
constitute constructive notice and thus failed to fulfill the current marking 




96  See U.S. Patent No. 207,559 fig.3 (filed Mar. 8, 1875) (depicting the original 1878 typewriter 
layout in which the six top-left keys spell “QWERTY”); see also, e.g., STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN 
E. MARGOLIS, THE ECONOMICS OF QWERTY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND POLICY 31–32 (Peter Lewin ed., 
2002) (discussing the historical mechanical motivations for the layout, which are no longer relevant to 
modern keyboards). 
97  U.S. Patent No. D556,191 (filed Apr. 21, 2006) (claiming “[t]he ornamental design for a key-
board for a handheld communication device”). 
98  BlackBerry Curve 8300 Features, BLACKBERRY.COM, http://na.blackberry.com/eng/devices/ 
blackberrycurve8300/curve_features.jsp#keyboard (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (showing the Curve’s 
keyboard’s traditional QWERTY layout with one letter per key). 
99  BlackBerry Storm2 9550 Smartphone, BLACKBERRY.COM, http://na.blackberry.com/eng/ 
devices/blackberrystorm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).  
100  35 U.S.C. § 292(a). 
101  Callaway Golf Patents, supra note 19. 
102  Id. 
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Unlike RIM, however, Callaway had designed a site that likely would 
have constituted legally sufficient marking under the virtual marking 
amendment.  Rather than merely listing all patent numbers that applied to 
one or more of its product models, Callaway’s site indicated which patent 
numbers applied to each product model.103  Clicking on a product such as 
the FT-iQ Driver loaded a page for the FT-iQ Driver and FT-iQ Tour Driv-
er.  A picture of the golf club was followed by a list of patent numbers and 
the statement that “[t]hese products are covered by one or more of the fol-
lowing U.S. Patents.”104   
The “one or more” language might have proved challenging for Calla-
way, however.  Some courts have held that the “one or more” language is 
sufficient to comply with traditional marking practices under § 287.105  The 
rationale for “one or more” has been the difficulty and expense of adjusting 
manufacturing practices to stay up to date with changes in applicable pa-
tents.106  However, this justification is not available to a patentee using vir-
tual marking because altering a webpage involves little expense.  Even if 
the site complied with § 287 under the proposed virtual marking amend-
ment recently passed by the Senate and pending in the House, the “one or 
more” language might have subjected Callaway to false marking liability.   
The problem of relying on “one or more” language to avoid false 
marking liability is further exacerbated by the fact that websites are not sub-
ject to the same inherent space limitations as the product itself.  If left un-
checked, companies could list thousands of patent numbers, as RIM did.  
Here, Callaway only listed eighty-three patent numbers for the FT-iQ Driv-
er,107 which is still a very large number of patents for the public to tolerate 
under the “one or more” condition.  Therefore, courts may not be as lenient 
in permitting conditional marking language when virtual marking is an op-
tion for patentees. 
Additionally, Callaway’s site arguably failed the consistent-and-




103  Compare FT-iQ Driver and FT-iQ Tour Driver, CALLAWAY GOLF, 
http://www.callawaygolf.com/Global/en-US/Products/Clubs/Drivers/FT-iQDriver/Patents.html (last vi-
sited Feb. 1, 2010) (image of former website on file with author), with Patent Information, supra note 19 
(listing RIM’s patents by country but not by product).  
104  Callaway Golf Patents, supra note 19. 
105  See, e.g., Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Hughes Tool Co., 192 F.2d 620, 625–26 (10th Cir. 1951). 
106  United States v. Gen. Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 817 (D.N.J. 1949) (finding the “one or 
more” language excusable as a practice commonly used “when multiple patents expiring at different 
times cover[] several objects”).  But see Pequignot I, 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 800 (E.D. Va. 2009) (explain-
ing that using “may be covered” language to mark an unpatented article with the intent to deceive the 
public is a false marking but finding that Solo did not show the requisite intent to deceive), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
107  See Callaway Golf Patents, supra note 19. 
108  For an overview of the consistent-and-continuous requirement, see supra notes 41–45 and ac-
companying text.  For a discussion of the consistent-and-continuous requirement as it might apply to 
virtual marking websites, see infra Part IV.B.2. 
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of the webpages for the listed products were down.  For example, following 
the link for the Hyper X Driver returned a 404 (page not found) error 
page.109  Callaway’s failure to maintain the marking site properly had re-
sulted in this discontinuity.  Therefore, a court may have found that Calla-
way’s virtual marking of the Hyper X Driver did not comply with the 
virtual marking amendment to § 287.110 
On a positive note, unlike RIM, Callaway’s site linked each patent 
number to a PDF copy of the patent itself.  This feature was not required 
under the recently proposed virtual marking amendment, and it provided no 
readily identifiable benefit to Callaway.  Even so, it represented a great ex-
ample of using the Internet to convey more information than would other-
wise be available under traditional patent marking.111 
IV. VIRTUAL MARKING REALITY 
In view of the virtual marking amendment and the examples provided 
by RIM and Callaway, this Part explores both the virtues and the vices of 
virtual marking.  Specifically, virtual marking enables patentees to convey 
accurate and timely information to the public about pending patents, ex-
pired patents, and patents involved in litigation.  On the other hand, paten-
tees could abuse virtual marking by marking with an unreasonable number 
of patents, keeping poor records of historical changes to the marking site, 
failing to ensure that their site is available, or violating the privacy of visi-
tors to the site.  The following cases and hypothetical scenarios provide 
guidance for how a proper virtual marking amendment should be structured 
by Congress and interpreted by the courts. 
A. Virtues 
1. Pending Patents.—Because traditional patent marking is closely 
tied to the manufacturing process, it is challenging for patentees to mark 
pending patents effectively.  Unfortunately, current patent marking law 
provides no help to patentees seeking to notify potential infringers of a 
pending patent.  By separating marking from manufacturing, virtual mark-
ing provides an innovative and effective solution for marking pending pa-
tents. 
Patent pendency is an extremely relevant issue because it takes an 
extraordinarily long time to obtain a patent; currently, the U.S. Patent and 




109  Page Not Found, CALLAWAY GOLF, http://www.callawaygolf.com/Global/en-US/ 
PageNotFound.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
110  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
111  For a full discussion of the Internet’s potential for the provision of extra patent information, see 
infra Part IV.B.4. 
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patent.112  Average pendency has risen steadily over time as the resource-
strapped Patent Office has faced an enormous backlog of applications.113  
For economic reasons, the USPTO decreased in size in 2010 and likely will 
make no progress toward significantly decreasing the backlog in the near 
future.114  Yet, manufacturers may release new products while waiting for 
patents covering those products to issue.115  In fact, an inventor can still ap-
ply for a patent in the United States up to a year after publicly disclosing the 
invention.116  Once the patent finally issues, certain rights against infringers 
extend back in time to the date that the USPTO published the application,117 




112  Patent Pendency Statistics—FY09, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/ 
patents/stats/patentpendency.jsp (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (indicating that the total average pendency 
for patents was 34.6 months in 2009).  As of February 2011, the Patents Dashboard showed an average 
pendency of 34 months.  See Patents Dashboard, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/ 
dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
113  Average pendency was only eighteen months in 1991.  Gene Quinn, USPTO Backlog: Patent 
Pendency out of Control, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 22, 2009, 7:43 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/ 
04/22/uspto-backlog-patent-pendency-out-of-control (displaying by graph that the average pendency 
was only eighteen months in 1991 and increased in most years since then); Patent Inventory Statistics—
FY09, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/appbacklog.jsp (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2011) (indicating a total backlog of 718,835 applications awaiting first office action by ex-
aminer at the end of Fiscal Year 2009). 
114  Phil Hirschkorn & Rebecca Jarvis, Patent Backlog Frustrates Inventors, CBS EVENING NEWS 
(Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/08/08/eveningnews/main6755116.shtml (quoting 
USPTO Director David Kappos’s need for funding “to hire 1,200 additional patent examiners and up-
grade the agency’s computer systems” to cut the backlog in half over the next five years).  See also Da-
vid Kappos, Dir., U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Remarks to IPO Annual Conference: The USPTO–Early 
Views and Initiatives of the Obama Administration (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.uspto.gov/ 
main/homepagenews/2009sep14_kappos_ipo_speech.htm (“This means no hiring in 2010, so the size of 
the agency will decrease.  It means no IT improvements, no overtime and probably no progress in cut-
ting into the backlog.”).  After Kappos’s speech in September 2009, the backlog held steady.  See Patent 
UPR Application Backlog, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/ 
patents/kpis/kpiBacklogDrilldown.kpixml (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (showing a slight decrease from 
718,835 patents in September 2009 to 708,535 applications in September 2010).  2011 budget cuts re-
quiring a hiring freeze, suspension of overtime, scaled back IT projects, and reduced training indicate 
that the backlog problem will not be addressed soon.  See David Kappos, An Update on the USPTO’s FY 
2011 Budget, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (Apr. 22, 2011, 9:08 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/ 
blog/director/entry/an_update_on_the_uspto. 
115  For industries relying on design patents in particular, the product lifecycle from design and 
manufacturing to sale to discontinuation is even shorter.   
116  See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention 
was . . . in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application 
for patent in the United States . . . .”). 
117  See id. § 154(d) (“[A] patent shall include the right to obtain a reasonable royalty from any per-
son who [infringes it] during the period beginning on the date of publication of the application for such 
patent . . . .”). 
118  Id. § 122(b)(1)(A).  Subject to certain exceptions, an applicant may request publication earlier 
than the standard eighteen-month period.  Id.; see also id. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (providing an option for ap-
plicants to defer publication indefinitely under certain circumstances).  Design patent applications are 
not subject to pre-issue publication.  Id. § 122(b)(2)(A)(iv).  
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The relative timing of the patenting and disclosure of a product is pri-
marily a strategic business decision.119  Often, a manufacturer will want to 
sell its product before the USPTO issues a patent protecting the product.  
For example, when Apple announced the first-generation iPhone in January 
2007, Chief Executive Officer Steve Jobs exclaimed, “And boy have we pa-
tented it!”120  Jobs claimed that Apple filed over 200 patent applications for 
inventions embodied within the iPhone prior to disclosing the product.121  
Notably, Apple waited until September 2007 to file an application for what 
could arguably become the most valuable iPhone-related patent: “Touch 
Screen Device, Method, and Graphical User Interface for Determining 
Commands by Applying Heuristics.”122  By the time this application issued 
as U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949 on January 20, 2009, Apple had already sold 
tens of millions of units with no patent marking.123  In March 2010, Apple 
sued mobile phone manufacturer High Tech Computer Corporation (HTC), 
in Delaware and via the International Trade Commission, for infringement 




119  Many companies, including Apple, Inc., strive to control how and when they disclose their in-
ventions.  See, e.g., Brad Stone & Ashlee Vance, Apple Obsessed with Secrecy on Products and Top Ex-
ecutives, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at B1. 
120  Steven P. Jobs, CEO, Apple, Inc., Keynote Address at MacWorld San Francisco 2007 at 33:52 
(Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=3206653149996743169# (last vi-
sited Mar. 18, 2011). 
121  Id. at 1:30:28; see also Steve O’Hear, What If Apple Sued Palm, Would Microsoft Come to the 
Rescue?, LAST100 (Jan. 22. 2009), http://www.last100.com/2009/01/22/what-if-apple-sued-palm-would-
microsoft-come-to-the-rescue (displaying an on-screen image from Jobs’s keynote address indicating 
that Apple filed over 200 patent applications for inventions in the iPhone). 
122  See U.S. Patent No. 7,479,949 (filed Apr. 11, 2008) (noting that it is a continuation from an ap-
plication filed September 5, 2007, and that it was issued on January 20, 2009).  The 371-page patent ap-
plication had been dubbed “the iPhone patent.”  E.g., Chris Ziegler, The iPhone Patent: Steven P. Jobs, 
Inventor, ENGADGET (May 30, 2008, 3:33 AM), http://www.engadget.com/2008/05/30/the-iphone-
patent-steven-p-jobs-inventor (emphasis added).  But see Nilay Patel, Apple vs. Palm: The In-Depth 
Analysis, ENGADGET (Jan. 28, 2009, 1:28 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2009/01/28/apple-vs-palm-
the-in-depth-analysis (analyzing the ’949 patent and other iPhone-related patents to show that the pa-
tents’ claims are narrower in scope than most journalists have realized). 
123  See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, iPhone Sales Grew 245% in 2008—Gartner, APPLE 2.0 (Mar. 12, 
2009, 10:18 AM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2009/03/12/iphone-sales-grew-245-in-2008-gartner.  For 
reasons known only to Apple insiders, new units sold after this patent issued have not been marked ei-
ther. 
124  Nilay Patel, Apple vs. HTC: A Patent Breakdown, ENGADGET (Mar. 2, 2010, 3:09 PM), 
http://www.engadget.com/2010/03/02/apple-vs-htc-a-patent-breakdown; see Apple v. High Tech Com-
puter Corp., No. 10-544, 2011 WL 143909, at *2 n.2 (D. Del. Jan. 18, 2011) (listing cases pending in 
Delaware in which Apple is suing HTC for patent infringement); Certain Portable Elec. Devices & Re-
lated Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-721 (Pending), http://info.usitc.gov/ouii/public/337inv.nsf/ 
56ff5fbca63b069e852565460078c0ae/1958d292f645d21285257743004fbc5e?OpenDocument (tracking 
status of the International Trade Commission investigation into Apple’s claims of patent infringement); 
see also Erick Schonfeld, The Complaint: Apple’s Patent Lawsuit Against HTC Is All About Android, 
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 2, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/03/02/the-complaint-apples-patent-lawsuit-
against-htc-is-all-about-android (explaining that Apple is targeting HTC because it is one of the largest 
manufacturers of mobile phones powered by Google, Inc.’s Android mobile operating system). 
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Infringement liability during the “patent pending” period is a gray area.  
For a company such as Apple to obtain damages dating from when the ap-
plication was published, the patent holder must prove that the infringer had 
“actual notice” of the published application.125  Yet, marking a product with 
“patent pending” does not necessarily convey notice because that phrase has 
no legal effect.126  Worse for these manufacturers, false use of phrases such 
as “patent pending” could make them liable for false marking fines.127  At 
best, the phrase informally warns potential infringers that a manufacturer is 
seeking patent protection for its product and might enforce any future 
rights. 
In contrast, virtual marking could provide an effective means of con-
veying notice about pending patent applications.  Imagine if, from day one, 
Apple had marked the iPhone with a virtual marking URL, which pointed to 
a site that Apple continuously updated as its pending utility patent applica-
tions were published.  As a result, potential infringers visiting the site 
would acquire actual notice of the published applications.  If an application 
eventually resulted in a substantially identical patent, then Apple would 
have a better chance of recovering reasonable royalty damages for in-
fringement starting from the publication date.128  Conversely, if Apple aban-
doned an application or the USPTO denied patent protection, then Apple 
could immediately remove the application from the product page to avoid 
potential liability for false marking.  With virtual marking, Apple could 
make any necessary changes in real time without changing the manufactur-
ing process of the physical device.129 
2. Expired Patents.—Compared to trademarks and copyrights, pa-
tents have a relatively short shelf life; they are typically valid for twenty 
years following the application filing date for utility patents and for four-




125  35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)(B) (2006).  A patent holder must also satisfy other requirements; for ex-
ample, the claims of the published patent application must be “substantially identical” to the claims of 
the subsequently issued patent.  Id. § 154(d)(2). 
126  General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/#marking (last updated Jan. 2005).  Some manufac-
turers may choose to indicate “patent pending” despite its having no legal effect because they are una-
ware of the law or believe that it will help ward off potential infringers. 
127  See 35 U.S.C. § 292. 
128  Only reasonable royalty damages are available for the time between the USPTO’s publication of 
a patent application and the issuance of the patent, provided that the resulting patent contains substan-
tially identical claims.  35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1)–(2). 
129  This would satisfy Senator Leahy’s virtual marking goal of “sav[ing] costs for producers of 
products that include technology on which a patent issues after the product is on the market.”  S. REP. 
NO. 111-18, at 14 (2009); see supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
130  See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (providing “a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues 
and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed”); id. § 173 (“Patents 
for designs shall be granted for the term of fourteen years from the date of grant.”).  A copyright endures 
for seventy years following the death of the last surviving author or up to 120 years from the date of cre-
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facturers can sell products while applicable patents are still pending,131 they 
can also sell products following the expiration of applicable patents.  If a 
manufacturer continues to mark its product with an expired patent number, 
however, it faces exposure to potential false marking liability. 
For example, in Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co., attorney Matthew Pequig-
not filed a qui tam false marking action against Solo, seeking fines because 
Solo sold disposable lids marked with an expired patent number.132  Wheth-
er a mark for an expired patent could constitute false marking was an issue 
of first impression.133  Furthermore, a lot of money was at stake.  Solo had 
marked billions of lids with numbers for expired patents, and Pequignot ar-
gued that each lid constituted a separate offense, punishable by a fine of up 
to $500.134 
The court held that the presumptive intent-to-deceive standard is wea-
kened, though not eliminated, for expired patents because expired patents 
convey useful information about the product to the public.135  Additionally, 
because the public can compute the expiration date of a patent, the court 
noted that the public could determine whether that patent had entered the 
public domain.136  Even though Solo knowingly manufactured lids marked 
with expired patent numbers, the court found that Solo lacked the requisite 
intent to deceive because it acted on advice of counsel, seeking to avoid the 
unreasonably high expense of replacing the molds used for manufacturing 
the lids.137 
Although it was not required to reach the issue of how to calculate 
damages, the district court noted that it would have only counted distinct 
decisions to mark falsely as separate offenses—not every erroneously 
marked lid.138  By that standard, Solo would be liable for at most $1500 
                                                                                                                 
ation of an anonymous work or work for hire.  17 U.S.C. § 302(a)–(c) (2006).  A trademark can last in-
definitely as long as the owner uses it continuously.  15 U.S.C. § 1058(b) (2006).  
131  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
132  Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co. (Pequignot I), 646 F. Supp. 2d 790, 792 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, 608 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
133  Id. at 797 (“No court has addressed how the [presumption of intent] standard applies to allega-
tions involving only expired patents.  As such, the question of what suffices to prove intent to deceive 
under such circumstances is one of first impression.”). 
134  Id. at 792, 801 (noting that Solo stipulated as to the number of lids manufactured but contended 
that it should be liable for at most three offenses for three distinct decisions to continue marking lids 
falsely). 
135  Id. at 797–98. 
136  Id. at 798.  However, it is difficult to calculate a patent’s expiration date.  See infra note 145.  
137  See id. at 798–99 (relaying the opinion of counsel and finding that Solo took reasonable steps to 
replace the mold cavities over time and did not intend to deceive the public). 
138  Id. at 803–04 (“[A]n ‘offense’ under 35 U.S.C. § 292 is a distinct decision by a defendant to 
falsely mark.  Accordingly, even if Solo . . . acted with an intent to deceive, it would be liable for at 
most three offenses of false marking.” (citing London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp., 179 F. 506, 508 (1st 
Cir. 1910))). 
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($500 for each of the three decisions to mark falsely).139  However, in a 
more recent case, the Federal Circuit held that the plain meaning of § 292 
requires counting each article as a separate offense, which in Pequignot 
would have meant counting each one of the billions of falsely marked 
lids.140  To soften the blow to patentees liable for false marking, the Federal 
Circuit soon after reiterated that the statute establishes a maximum fine of 
$500 per falsely marked article and clarified that the district courts have 
discretion to balance enforcing § 292 against imposing disproportionately 
large fines for mass-produced articles.141 
As with pending patents, virtual marking could have helped Solo avoid 
the expired patent issue.  If Solo had created molds that read, “Patents: 
http://solocup.com/patents/lids,” it could have updated the site at virtually 
no cost, and no physical change to the lids or the manufacturing process 
would have been necessary.  If the product page continued to list the patents 
and clearly noted that they had expired, then virtual marking would achieve 
the same public benefit that the court identified without raising any concern 
as to whether it constituted a false mark. 
Requiring patentees to change their manufacturing processes to remove 
web-address marks pointing only to expired patents would unnecessarily 
entangle the separate patenting and manufacturing processes again.  Addi-
tionally, the small risk of deception inherent in the mere presence of a pa-
tent URL on the product is balanced by the beneficial information obtained 
from the expired patents,142 and it is no more detrimental than the current 
practice of allowing conditional language such as “one or more.”143  Fur-
thermore, virtual marking confers other useful benefits with respect to pa-
tent expiration in particular.  The USPTO does not print the expiration date 




139  See id. at 792, 803–04. 
140  See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co. (Forest Group III), 590 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(“[T]he statute’s plain language requires the penalty to be imposed on a per article basis.”); see also in-
fra Part IV.A.3 (further discussing the Forest Group damage calculation). 
141  Id. at 1304.  Of course, with respect to Solo’s 21 billion lids, the maximum fine would total ap-
proximately $10 trillion.  Justin E. Gray & Harold C. Wegner, The New Patent Marking Police: Answer-
ing Clontech and Forest Group, GRAY ON CLAIMS, 5 (Jan. 8, 2010), http://www.grayonclaims.com/ 
storage/MarkingPoliceVers4.pdf.  If the fine were set at one-tenth of a penny per lid, the fine would still 
amount to $21 million.  See id. at 6.  Solo escaped this staggering liability when the Federal Circuit af-
firmed that it lacked the requisite intent to deceive the public.  See Pequignot v. Solo Cup Co. (Pequig-
not II), 608 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
142  See Pequignot I, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 797–98.  
143  See supra notes 105–06. 
144  See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,589,569 (filed Aug. 22, 1984).  This patent for a drinking cup lid was 
one of the expired patents that Solo had marked on its manufactured lids.  Pequignot I, 646 F. Supp. 2d 
at 792.  The expiration date is not listed, and at first glance, one might assume that it did not expire until 
August 24, 2004, twenty years after it was filed.  See id.  The patent actually expired on October 24, 
2003, because it was a continuation-in-part of a separate application filed on October 24, 1983.  See id.; 
see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (providing a term for twenty years from the filing date of an earli-
er filed application, if any). 
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ways easy to calculate.145  Also, it could be risky and burdensome to hope 
that someone will remember to update the mark over a decade later when 
the patent expires.  To avoid becoming liable for false marking as patents 
gradually expire over time, patentees can insert the expiration dates next to 
each patent number on their virtual marking sites.  Like information about 
pending applications and lawsuits, expiration dates provide useful informa-
tion to the public while avoiding any confusion about false marking.  Addi-
tionally, a clever computer programmer could enable the system running 
the virtual marking site to automatically remove expired listings or generate 
a statement that a particular patent expired on its date of expiration. 
3. Invalidated Patents.—A patent issued by the USPTO is presump-
tively valid.146  If a patent is never involved in litigation or a reexamination 
proceeding at the USPTO, then the patent remains valid and enforceable un-
til it expires.  If, however, a patent becomes involved in litigation and is in-
validated, then it no longer protects any product.147  A product that is 
marked with the invalidated patent’s number exposes the patentee to false 
marking liability.  Because courts invalidate nearly half of all litigated pa-
tents,148 a solution allowing the holders of invalidated patents to indicate this 
change instantly would be extremely helpful. 
As with expired patents, it is faster and cheaper to remove the invalid 
patent number from a virtual marking site than to change a manufacturing 
process.  The patentee could update the site on the same day that the unfa-
vorable opinion is released and provide context about the litigation or revert 




145  See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (providing numerous exceptions and opportunities for adjustment to the 
standard term of twenty years from the filing date); Pequignot II, 608 F.3d at 1362 (“[D]etermining the 
expiration date of a patent can, at times, be difficult.  The date of the patent grant is shown on the first 
page of a patent, but its term currently also depends on the date it was filed; in 1994, the effective term 
of a patent changed from seventeen years commencing at issuance to twenty years from filing.  Fur-
thermore, the term depends on whether there are patent term adjustments and whether the patent owner 
has paid maintenance fees.  Thus, as with a never-patented article, an article marked with an expired pa-
tent number imposes on the public ‘the cost of determining whether the involved patents are valid and 
enforceable.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Clontech Labs. Inc. v. Invitrogen Corp., 406 F.3d 1347, 1357 
n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2005))); see also Dennis Crouch, Calculating Patent Term, PATENTLY-O (June 5, 2010, 
2:49 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/06/calculating-patent-term.html (listing “at least” sev-
en steps involved in the process for determining whether an issued patent is still in force).  But see Pe-
quignot I, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 798 (“[A]ny person with basic knowledge of the patent system can look up 
the patent and determine its expiration date.”). 
146  35 U.S.C. § 282 (“A patent shall be presumed valid.  Each claim of a patent (whether in inde-
pendent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity 
of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent 
upon an invalid claim.”). 
147  More precisely, invalid claims can no longer provide protection.  If the patent has any remaining 
valid claims, then a patentee can still sue for infringement of the valid claims.  See id. § 288. 
148  See Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 5 
& n.10 (2006) (“[A]bout 45% of litigated patents are held invalid . . . .”). 
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A more complicated situation arises when a court merely interprets the 
scope of a valid patent during patent infringement litigation.  During claim 
construction, a process that occurs at a pretrial proceeding called a Mark-
man hearing, the judge determines what the language used in the patent 
claims at issue actually means for the purpose of the litigation.149  On ap-
peal, the Federal Circuit reviews claim construction without deference to 
the trial court’s opinion.150  Just as with invalid patents, a patent determined 
to have narrower scope under a court’s unfavorable claim construction, 
whether at trial or on appeal, exposes the patentee to false marking liability 
if it marks a now-excluded product with that patent number.   
For example, in Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas fined Forest $500 for selling goods that it had marked with a 
patent that had received unfavorable claim construction from a court in 
Minnesota during a prior lawsuit.151  The patent in question covered stilts 
used in the construction industry.152  On February 15, 2007, the Minnesota 
court issued a claim construction opinion, interpreting the claims in such a 
way that Forest’s patent did not cover either Forest’s stilts or the stilts of 
accused infringer Bon Tool.153   
The district court in Texas recognized that unfavorable claim construc-
tion puts the patentee in a tricky situation.154  On one hand, the patentee 
knows it will be engaged in false marking going forward.  On the other 
hand, the unfavorable claim construction stands a reasonable chance of be-




149  EMI Grp. N. Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887, 891–92 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Construction of 
the claims by the trial court is often conducted upon a preliminary evidentiary hearing, called a Mark-
man hearing in homage to the decision [Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)] 
that established that this step must be performed by the judge, not the jury.”). 
150  Id. at 891 (“[A]ny disputed questions concerning the meaning and scope of patent claims . . . are 
treated as questions of law and are determined de novo on appeal, without deference to the decision of 
the trial court.”). 
151  See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co. (Forest Group II), No. H-05-4127, 2008 WL 4376346, 
at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
152  See id. at *3–4. 
153  See Forest Grp., Inc. v. Bon Tool Co. (Forest Group I), No. H-05-4127, 2008 WL 2962206, 
at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 29, 2008) (“Neither the Bon Tool stilt nor the Forest stilt included a resiliently 
lined yoke, and neither stilt needed the spring to maintain the vertical supports and the platforms in a 
‘parallelogram configuration’” in accordance with the court’s claim construction.), motion to amend de-
nied, 2008 WL 4376346, aff’d in part, vacated in part, 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
154  Id. at *3 (“[D]uring pendency of infringement litigation, the tension between § 292 and § 287(a) 
may place a patent holder in a precarious position.”). 
155  Based on an empirical analysis performed in 2001, when the Federal Circuit reviews claim con-
struction, it modifies the trial court’s construction almost as often as not, and frequently that modifica-
tion results in reversal of the trial court’s decision.  See Christian A. Chu, Note, Empirical Analysis of 
the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1104 (2001) (demon-
strating that, in cases that involved a review of claim construction, the Federal Circuit modified the 
claim construction 44% of the time and, of those cases, reversed on the basis of the modification 68% of 
the time).  In total, the Federal Circuit reverses nearly 30% of cases that involve a review of claim con-
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peal is pending, it will fail to satisfy the consistent-and-continuous marking 
requirement.156  To ease the burden on patentees, the court held that “a sin-
gle district court’s adverse claim construction ruling . . . that results in the 
inference that a patent holder’s product is not covered by the patent in issue 
should not suffice to establish a § 292 false marking claim.”157 
In Forest Group, however, there was more than a single unfavorable 
claim construction.158  The patent was rendered sufficiently narrow such that 
Forest should have known to stop marking its stilts with that number.  Be-
cause § 292 provides no definition of “per offense” to calculate damages, 
the parties disputed the method of counting offenses.159  The district court 
counted only the single order that was placed and filled after Forest had 
knowledge that it was falsely marking under the newly determined scope of 
its patent and assessed the maximum fine of $500 for one offense.160  In its 
reversing opinion, however, the Federal Circuit ordered the district court to 
calculate damages per each article sold with the false mark.161 
Although this outcome was arguably fair, the case might not have been 
decided correctly.  Even if it was reasonable for the Southern District of 
Texas to create an exception to the false marking statute for interlocutory 
adverse Markman or other rulings in pending lawsuits,162 the court provided 
no clear standard for applying the exception.  The court did not explain how 
                                                                                                                 
struction.  Id.; see also Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1161, 1175 fig.1, 1184 (2010) (“As such, we should find that the best data available today—which 
show about a 30 percent reversal rate—raise a substantial cause for concern over the cases that are re-
versed on claim construction grounds.”). 
156  Forest Group I, 2008 WL 2962206, at *3 (“[I]f a patent holder stops marking its product, even if 
only temporarily during pendency of a lawsuit after an interlocutory adverse Markman or other ruling, in 
order to avoid potential liability under § 292, the patent holder will have lost the ability to recover dam-
ages from infringers—even if the holder ultimately succeeds in establishing the asserted patent covers 
the patent holder’s product—because its products have not been marked ‘substantially consistently and 
continuously.’”). 
157  Id. at *4. 
158  See id. at *4 n.4 (“[T]he Court finds that those factors are overcome in this case by the existence 
of four rulings from two separate federal district courts in this uncomplicated case about a very 
straightforward patent.”). 
159  See id. at *6 (holding that the $500 fine was appropriate because Forest made only one decision 
to mark its stilts after it learned that those stilts may not be covered under the new construction claim 
ruling); see also Forest Group II, No. H-05-4127, 2008 WL 4376346, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, 590 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (describing the court’s decision to follow 
First Circuit precedent instead of an unpublished District of Utah case in which the judge appeared mo-
tivated by a desire to maximize the penalty to the patentee). 
160  Forest Group I, 2008 WL 2962206, at *6. 
161  Forest Group III, 590 F.3d at 1301 (“[T]he statute’s plain language requires the penalty to be 
imposed on a per article basis.”).  On remand, the district court set the fine at $180 per article, which 
was the highest price at which Forest Group sold any of the falsely marked stilts.  Forest Grp, Inc. v. 
Bon Tool Co. (Forest Group IV), No. H-05-4127, 2010 WL 1708433, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2010).  
By using the highest price, the court sought to deprive Forest Group of more than it made in total reve-
nues from the stilts so as to fulfill § 292’s deterrent purpose.  Id. 
162  See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. 
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simple the patent needs to be or how many adverse claim constructions in 
how many different courts would be sufficient to establish conclusively that 
any subsequent continued marking constitutes knowing false marking. 
Virtual marking presents a unique opportunity to eliminate this arbi-
trary standard without unfairly burdening the patentee.  Virtual marking 
sites enable patentees to post detailed information about the status of pa-
tents and claims involved in pending lawsuits.  By simply providing a cita-
tion to a claim construction opinion, a diligent patentee can ensure that it 
complies with the consistent-and-continuous marking standard while elimi-
nating the possibility of deception for purposes of the false marking statute.  
Therefore, virtual marking relieves the tension between § 287 and § 292 by 
conveying notice to the public that a patent’s viability may temporarily be 
indeterminate. 
4. Internet Patents.—While the foregoing sections focused on the 
virtual marking of tangible products, this section briefly discusses virtual 
products.  Some patents explicitly claim Internet-based technology found in 
websites, in which case the websites themselves are the products, and they 
should be marked to avoid a limitation on damages.163  Other times, where 
the patent does not explicitly claim a website, but the website is intrinsic to 
what the patent does claim, such as the means by which a patented database 
is accessed, the website still should be marked.164  A number of websites al-
ready publish patent information, including Amazon.com (Amazon).165 
Arguably, virtual marking is less relevant for virtual products such as 
websites because the marking that occurs is already on a website.  It might 
seem nonsensical for a website to refer to a different virtual marking site.  
Indeed, virtual marking is far more valuable for low-tech products created 
from expensive manufacturing processes, as well as high-tech products 
such as graphing calculators and smartphones that are covered by dozens of 
patents.  Nevertheless, the virtual marking of physical products and the 
marking of virtual products produce similar results: applicable patent num-




163  Eugene Goryunov & Mark Polyakov, To Mark or Not to Mark: Application of the Patent Mark-
ing Statute to Websites and the Internet, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Fall 2007, at 1, 5 (“The Federal Circuit has 
not had the opportunity to determine whether a website can constitute a patented article.  However, case 
law indicates that when given the opportunity, the Federal Circuit will likely hold that a website that is 
expressly claimed in the patent-in-suit constitutes a patented article under the Marking Statute and must 
be marked to satisfy the constructive notice requirement and not limit the recovery of damages.”).   
164  Id. at 12 (“[W]hile the website is not the patented invention, it ‘is intrinsic to the patented system 
and constitutes a tangible item to mark by which notice of the asserted method can be given.’” (quoting 
IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC, No. 03-1067-SLR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33179, at *12 (D. Del. Dec. 
14, 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
165  See Non-exhaustive List of Applicable Amazon/Affiliate Patents and Applicable Licensed Pa-
tents, AMAZON.COM (“One or more patents owned by Amazon or its affiliates apply to this Site and to 
the features and services accessible via the Site.”), http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display. 
html/?nodeId=200204190 (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). 
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Going forward, courts should make every effort to provide uniform vir-
tual marking standards for these two domains of products.  The simplest 
policy would be to require virtual products to use the same virtual marking 
website system as tangible products.  Instead of listing patent numbers di-
rectly on Amazon’s primary website, Amazon would provide a link to a vir-
tual marking website that lists patent numbers just as a virtual marking 
website for a smartphone would.  Thereafter, any rules established for vir-
tually marking tangible products should also apply to marking virtual prod-
ucts.  For example, if a court determines that a virtual marking site must 
include hyperlinks from patent numbers to the patent documents them-
selves, then marked websites should be required to comply with that re-
quirement as well. 
Without a uniform virtual marking standard for virtual products, 
marked websites would be free to take advantage of all of the benefits of 
virtual marking without the various quid pro quos that should be established 
to prevent abuse of the virtual marking system.  For example, nothing 
would prevent Amazon from listing thousands of patent numbers on its 
website as RIM did.  Nothing would stop Amazon from changing the con-
tents of its virtual marking site without maintaining adequate historical 
records.  Enforcing virtual marking requirements for virtual products would 
close these marking loopholes that patentees of virtual products could oth-
erwise take advantage of. 
B. Vices 
This section analyzes the many potential pitfalls for virtual marking 
that have not yet been addressed by Congress or the courts.  To avoid these 
pitfalls and to optimize the benefits of virtual marking, Congress should 
create a public virtual marking product registry or set forth guidelines to en-
sure proper design and maintenance of patentees’ or third parties’ virtual 
marking sites.  The public virtual marking product registry could enforce a 
number of requirements to ensure that patentees comply with the spirit of 
patent marking law. 
This section discusses several desirable features in a public registry: 
(1) limiting patent marks to a reasonable number of patents, (2) reconciling 
technical difficulties with the consistent-and-continuous marking require-
ment, (3) guaranteeing that marking websites remain accessible to members 
of the public while protecting their privacy, and (4) disseminating addition-
al information to the public where a patentee would not otherwise have an 
incentive to do so itself. 
1. Virtual Infinity.—Limiting product pages to a reasonable number 
of patent marks or requiring patentees to highlight the most critical and val-
uable patents would reduce the risk that patentees would abuse the notice 
provisions of the marking statute.  Allowing patentees to list thousands of 
patent numbers with no guidance for the public does not provide adequate 
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notice.  Yet the virtual marking amendment does not limit the number of 
patents permitted on a virtual marking site.166  Granted, there is no official 
limit on the number of patents that patentees can list under traditional mark-
ing law,167 but there is a de facto limit due to space constraints on the physi-
cal product. 
Consider the TI-83 Plus.168  Even though TI owned at least seven pa-
tents—and perhaps hundreds—covering the complex electronic calcula-
tor,169 due to space limitations, TI chose to mark the device with only three 
patent numbers.170  Patentees currently face practical limits dictated by the 
space available on physical products, whereas a website has theoretically 
limitless length.  Courts have not yet considered how many patent listings 
on a product can reasonably convey notice under either traditional or virtual 
marking, and the virtual marking amendment provides no further guid-
ance.171 
Congress could address this issue in two ways.  First, it could modify 
the virtual marking amendment to provide a limit to the number of valid pa-
tents that can be listed for a single product.  Alternatively, Congress could 
authorize a public virtual marking product registry, which could enforce a 
reasonable limit by preventing patentees from adding more than a prede-
termined number of marks to a product page.  Although any limit that Con-
gress imposed would be arbitrary, Congress must choose some reasonable 
limit to avoid undue hardship to the public.  Only marks referring to valid, 
enforceable patents should count toward this limit so that patentees will not 
be dissuaded from providing the public with helpful information about ex-
pired or otherwise unenforceable patents. 
2. Consistent-and-Continuous Uptime.—Another major concern for 
virtual marking is the well-established consistent-and-continuous standard 
for compliance with the marking statute.172  Websites are inherently unsta-




166  See H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 15(a)(1) (as reported by H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 14, 
2011) (requiring association with “the number of the patent”); S. 23, 112th Cong. § 4(b) (as passed by 
Senate, Mar. 8, 2011) (same).  However, the amendment appears to permit association with an unlimited 
number of patents. 
167  See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) (containing no language limiting the number of patents that can 
be marked on a product). 
168  See supra notes 4, 7 and accompanying text. 
169  For example, a search for (TI-83$ and an/"Texas Instruments") on the USPTO website provides 
seven results, and a search for (calculator$ and an/"Texas Instruments") provides over six hundred re-
sults.  USPTO FULL-TEXT AND IMAGE DATABASE, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-adv.htm 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (results obtained using Advanced Search function).  Note that “$” is a root 
expander, and “an/” is a search field that limits results to those patents that were initially assigned to a 
particular assignee, here “Texas Instruments.” 
170  See supra notes 4, 7 and accompanying text. 
171  See H.R. 1249 § 15(a)(1); S. 23 § 4(b). 
172  See supra notes 41–45, 108 and accompanying text. 
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when a member of the public attempts to view it, that could be a violation 
of the “continuous” element of the compliance standard.  Callaway’s virtual 
marking site exemplified this potential problem as it included several bro-
ken links to product pages.  A certain amount of downtime may be accepta-
ble.  If Congress authorized a public virtual marking registry, then any 
discontinuity due to downtime that occurred on the public server could be 
excusable.  Alternatively, courts might be lenient with a patentee that exer-
cises reasonable due diligence to return its private marking site to a func-
tioning state. 
Modification of the data posted on marking sites raises additional ques-
tions.  One issue is how much modification, in form or content, is permissi-
ble under the “consistent” element of the compliance standard.  To get the 
maximum benefit from virtual marking, patentees should be permitted to 
modify their sites liberally.  However, patentees should also be required to 
keep records of all past revisions as evidence of the contents on a particular 
date or range of dates.  Again, a public registry could most readily enforce 
this requirement by managing revisions itself, storing records of past revi-
sions, and imposing certain limits on the degree or frequency of modifica-
tions to ensure that consistency is maintained. 
A related issue is whether members of the public should be allowed to 
view the past revisions, as opposed to being limited to viewing only the cur-
rent version of the page at the time and date when they visit it.  Any virtual 
marking website should include a notification system that alerts members of 
the public who subscribe to it that a particular page has been updated.  A 
public registry would ensure consistency in the structure and appearance of 
product pages and also guarantee that records of past revisions were availa-
ble as required by law. 
3. Privacy and Accessibility.—Virtual marking, unlike traditional 
marking, also raises privacy concerns.  Website operators can log extensive 
analytics about visitors to the site,173 including the Internet Protocol (IP) ad-
dress and physical location of a visitor, the length of time a visitor views a 
page, and the specific parts of the page the visitor clicks on.  If patentees 
recorded this information, the public might be discouraged from looking up 
the patents covering the product, which would defeat the purpose of the 
marking statute.  Thus, to protect the public’s privacy, patentees should not 
be permitted to record this information or to use this information in court as 
evidence of actual notice.  Again, a public registry avoids these issues be-
cause it can enforce a strict privacy policy for the entire site, logging only 
what information is necessary to comply with the law.  Alternatively, Con-





173  See, e.g., GOOGLE ANALYTICS, http://www.google.com/analytics (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) 
(providing free “[e]nterprise-class web analytics” to website operators).  
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Accessibility is another issue; the current amendment specifies that any 
valid virtual marking site must be “accessible to the public without charge 
for accessing the address.”174  However, even many free websites still re-
quire registration.  A strict reading of the amendment suggests that paten-
tees would be permitted to require members of the public to register for free 
before gaining access to the site.  There is no theoretical limit to the kind 
and quantity of information that patentees would be able to collect in ex-
change for viewing their “free” marking site, such as individual names, 
company names, mailing and e-mail addresses, phone numbers, birthdays, 
and attorney bar registration numbers.  Congress should set limits on what 
information may be collected and adopt a privacy standard for collected in-
formation.  In addition, it should prohibit patentees from using this informa-
tion for marketing purposes, selling it to third parties, or submitting 
information linked to an alleged infringer’s account as evidence in court. 
Congress should modify the virtual marking amendment to mandate 
that any valid virtual marking site be accessible to the public not only with-
out charge but also without any other barriers, restrictions, or privacy incur-
sions for accessing the address.  An authorized public registry would 
provide a convenient enforcement mechanism. 
4. Additional Data Requirements.—A major benefit of virtual mark-
ing sites is that they allow patentees to post a variety of patent-related in-
formation inexpensively.  To maximize the benefit of virtual marking, sites 
should list all relevant information, such as published patent applications, 
expiration dates for current patents, and data about pending litigation.  To 
minimize expense and unnecessary disclosure to the public, however, most 
patentees are likely to fulfill only the minimum duties required by law.175  
Callaway’s site provided hyperlinks to each patent document, but RIM’s 
did nothing but list thousands of patent numbers by country.176  The useful-
ness of RIM’s site was worse than if RIM had marked its BlackBerry with a 
few select applicable patent numbers instead.  For this reason, the virtual 
marking amendment should include specific requirements and guidelines 
for site content and organization. 
A public registry could readily enforce standards for additional infor-
mation.  For example, patentees could be required to provide the expiration 
date for any patent listed, and the public registry could update the site au-
tomatically as those patents expire.  If a court invalidates the claim of a pa-
tent, the patentee could be required to update the public registry and remove 
the patent number or disclaim those individual claims on the product page 
itself within a specific time period.  Congress should also modify the virtual 




174  H.R. 1249 § 15(a)(1); S. 23 § 4(b). 
175  Callaway Golf appeared to be an exception to the rule by providing additional features such as 
hyperlinked patent numbers.  See supra Part III.B.   
176  See supra text accompanying note 93. 
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would be required to facilitate the retrieval of information by creating 
hyperlinks from patent numbers to the patent itself, as Callaway did, or by 
providing search functionality that searches only within the patents listed. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
The virtual marking amendment is a step in the right direction, but it 
still will lead to a host of new patent marking problems if it is enacted.  Ul-
timately, for every benefit to be realized through virtual marking, there is at 
least one potential pitfall that must be addressed.  This Part proposes mod-
ifications to the amendment to address these issues, along with a summary 
of how best to implement the amendment based on the preceding discus-
sion. 
A. Amending the Amendment 
The current amendment would only insert the following text into the 
marking statute: “or by fixing thereon the word ‘patent’ or the abbreviation 
‘pat.’ together with an address of a posting on the Internet, accessible to the 
public without charge for accessing the address, that associates the patented 
article with the number of the patent . . . .”177  Congress should modify the 
amendment to include the following additional provisions: (1) the Internet 
posting shall be restricted to a reasonable number of patent numbers, (2) the 
Internet host shall take reasonable measures to guarantee reasonable uptime 
for the posting, (3) the Internet host shall maintain accurate records of all 
revisions to the posting, and (4) the Internet host shall not collect informa-
tion about the public for accessing the address. 
B. Leveling the Playing Field 
The current virtual marking amendment would eliminate much of the 
frustration to manufacturers by disentangling the patent process from the 
manufacturing process.  From the manufacturer’s standpoint, it is truly a 
“set-it-and-forget-it” solution.  The manufacturer need only label a product 
with a single, persistent URL, and it will never have to change the URL 
over the lifetime of the production cycle. 
Yet the currently sparse amendment would open too wide a frontier for 
patentees.  It lacks incentives to ensure that the public also reaps the bene-
fits of the new marking system.  In fact, it exposes the public to new dan-
gers that do not exist today due to the practical limitations of marking 
tangible products.  The modified amendment proposed in this Comment 
provides several statutory guarantees to protect the public.  The four pro-
posed provisions are not exhaustive, but they represent a good starting point 
to ensure that when virtual marking becomes a reality, the public will stand 




177  H.R. 1249 § 15(a)(1); S. 23 § 4(b). 
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C. Alternatives to a Public Registry 
A public virtual marking site, a product registry of sorts maintained by 
the USPTO, would eliminate most of the potential problems, but it comes at 
a high cost.  Creating and maintaining the website would be expensive for 
taxpayers, and it would have to be authorized by a statute far more complex 
than even the modified virtual marking amendment in this proposal.  Con-
gress, the USPTO, and the courts would need to juggle the creation, imple-
mentation, and enforcement of all the various standards and requirements 
necessary for the site to function properly.  If running a public registry 
proves too much for the government to handle for the sake of modernizing 
patent marking, then Congress should consider the following potential al-
ternatives. 
The simplest option would be to permit patentees to maintain their own 
private virtual marking sites, just as RIM and Callaway Golf once did.  The 
additional provisions mandated in the amendment proposed here mitigate 
some of the potential harm to the public due to the lack of incentives in an 
open-ended virtual marking system like the one that was suggested by the 
recently proposed amendment.  Although this option is the easiest and most 
cost-effective for the government in the short term, there are two main dis-
advantages.  First, the public will need to trust patentees to comply with the 
statute and rely on courts to enforce the statute when they do not.  Second, 
if the provisions are too stringent and too inconvenient for patentees, the 
potential liability and expense will outweigh the benefits of virtual marking.  
If patentees refuse to transition to virtual marking, then the amendment will 
have no remedial effect on the shortcomings of traditional marking law. 
A better alternative to a public registry maintained by the government 
would be to authorize one or more private companies to maintain registries 
on behalf of the government.  This exact scenario is taking place in the tele-
communications industry.  The Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) granted permission to Google and several other companies to man-
age authorized databases of “white space” in the radio frequency spec-
trum,178 which will alleviate the expense for the FCC to run the database 
itself.  Moreover, even in the absence of a virtual marking amendment, 
Ocean Tomo’s patent marking website suggests that there is a private com-
mercial market for creating these kinds of registries for the benefit of paten-




178  Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broad. Bands, Nos. 04-186 & 02-380, DA 11-31 (FCC Jan. 26, 
2011) (FCC Daily Digest), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-11-131A1.pdf; Eliza-
beth Woyke, FCC Appoints Google as “White Space” Administrator, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2011), 
http://blogs.forbes.com/elizabethwoyke/2011/01/26/fcc-appoints-google-as-white-space-administrator; 
see also Richard Whitt, Our Proposal to Build and Operate a White Spaces Database, GOOGLE PUB. 
POL’Y BLOG (Jan. 4, 2010, 7:35 PM), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2010/01/our-proposal-to-
build-and-operate-white.html. 
179  In fact, Ocean Tomo now provides accounts and unique URLs that patentees can use to provide 
virtual patent marking information—one indication that a centralized database has a place in virtual 
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Congress stands a better chance of regulating the private virtual marking 
industry while avoiding the expense and effort required to maintain its own 
site.  The major pitfall of this alternative would be the need to ensure that 
the authorized websites are adequately remunerated without disadvantaging 
small entities such as startups and private inventors. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the standards that develop for virtual marking, whether for 
private or public sites, must effectively balance the needs of patentees and 
the public.  The standards must ensure that information is provided such 
that the policy needs that motivated the original marking statutes are satis-
fied.  Virtual marking should benefit both the public and patentees, but the 
standards must not be too burdensome.  If the rules are too complex or cost-
ly, then patentees will avoid virtual marking unless the law requires it.  In 
the absence of mandatory virtual marking, courts must enforce the marking 
statute consistently for both traditional and virtual patent marking.  Instead 
of showing leniency to patentees facing charges of false marking due to the 
high cost of changing manufacturing practices, courts must hold the paten-
tees accountable for false marking that could have been avoided through 
virtual marking. 
Relying on the patentees themselves to implement effective virtual 
marking would be detrimental to the public.  The most effective way to 
guarantee the success of virtual marking is through the creation of a public 
virtual marking product registry.  Otherwise, if the registry proves too cost-
ly, the best compromise that would likely still balance the needs of paten-
tees with those of the public would be for Congress to authorize 
independent, third-party companies to host private virtual-marking product 
registries.  The registries must be operated in accordance with the standards 
mandated by the modified virtual marking amendment. 
                                                                                                                 
marking.  See OCEAN TOMO PATENTMARKING, http://www.patentmarking.com/patentmarking (last vi-
sited Mar. 18, 2011); see also supra note 21. 
